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THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE: ADOPTING A NEW
STANDARD AND A RETURN TO PRINCIPLE

Timothy J. Slattery*

INTRODUCTION

In one of the more controversial terms for the Supreme Court-adjudicating
cases about sentencing guidelines,1 gun control laws,' and the constitutionality of
lethal injection 3 -a small case out of a Kentucky appeals court will likely have the
largest influence on our everyday lives. George and Catherine Davis, a couple from
Kentucky, filed suit against the State for the disparate tax treatment of in-state and
out-of-state municipal bonds, implicating the Dormant Commerce Clause.4 In a multitrillion-dollar market, any small movement has massive implications,' but foundational changes have profound effects across the entire economy. With an economy
concerned about economic stimulus packages, falling interest rates, collapsing financial institutions, and the subprime mortgage crisis,6 it is distressing to imagine the
challenges the economy would face if the municipal bond market adjusted to the
changing tax treatment.
This Note will examine currentDormant Commerce Clause doctrine in the context
of the Court's latest decision, Departmentof Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis. Through
its decisions regarding the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court has continually created more confusion and uncertainty. Beginning with distinctions such
as whether the statute in question is economically protectionist and continuing to
whether the benefits accrue to public or private entities, the current doctrine is a veritable chaotic collection of doctrine with little cohesion between decisions. This Note
analyzes current Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine and proposes a new standard
for deciding such challenges with more principle, precision, and predictability.
* J.D., William & Mary School of Law, 2009; B.A., College of William & Mary, 2006.
I wish to thank my editor for helping me throughout the process and for never doubting me.
I also wish to thank my family and friends for always providing the support, love, and
encouragement I need-I owe each of you a tremendous amount.
Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007).
2 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
3 Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008).
4 Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008).
5 Tom Herman, Tax Report: Kentucky Suffers Setback in Muni-Bond Tax Case, WALL

ST. J., Sept. 6, 2006, at D2.
6 See Sarah Lueck et al., DefaultFearsUnnerve Markets: Bush, DemocratsRush to Roll
Out Stimulus Plan, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2008, at Al.
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Part I discusses the background to the principal case, including the statutory
background in Davis and its pervasiveness throughout the country. Part 1I reviews
a brief history of municipal fundraising, including benefits, purposes, and expansion
of the municipal bond market, to provide a context for the extent of the markets and
the widespread effect of Davis. Part HI scrutinizes current Dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine, including the distinctions, categorizations, and exceptions-all of
which haphazardly flood a muddied field of constitutional law. Part IV proposes a
new standard for the Supreme Court to adopt in its analysis of Dormant Commerce
Clause challenges, including policy and constitutional reasons for adopting the standard. Part IV also analyzes past precedent in light of the proposed standard, finding
that much of the current doctrine fits into the strict scrutiny framework. Part V returns
to the Davis case, considers lessons learned from past precedent under the new standard, and applies the new standard to the facts in Davis. This Note concludes that
the best way to approach Dormant Commerce Clause cases is through adoption of
strict scrutiny as a uniform standard.
I. BACKGROUND TO DAVIS

Municipal bond issues, aside from taxes, are a predominant method for states and
localities to raise much-needed funds for local public works projects and other area
requirements. With the advent of "triple tax exemption" from federal, state, and city
taxes, municipal bonds are a $2.3 trillion market. 7 The tax exemption provides incentive for residents to invest in municipal bonds and promote local projects.8 Their
increasing prevalence to raise funds for local needs led to special tax treatment at both
the federal and state levels. 9
Kentucky Revised Statutes govern individual state income taxes on net income,
which is determined after deductions from an individual's adjusted gross income.l°
Kentucky's statute includes "interest income derived from obligations of sister states
and political subdivisions thereof' in its definition of adjusted gross income, but
importantly, not interest income from obligations of Kentucky and its political subdivisions. I I The statute, in conjunction with the other definitions of adjusted gross
income, effectively exempts in-state municipal bonds while taxing their out-of-state
counterparts.
' See Herman, supranote 5. State and local governments increasingly use municipal bonds
to raise funds without increasing the state tax burden. State and local governments issued over
$350 billion from 2002 to 2006. Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court to Address State Tax
Breaksfor Bonds, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2007, at C3.
8 See Herman, supra note 5.

9 See infra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.010(11) (West 2006). Adjusted gross income is found by
taking deductions from gross income, as defined by the IRS. I.R.C. § 62 (2006). The definition
of gross income does not include interest on state or local bonds. I.R.C. § 103 (2006).
11 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.010(10)(c) (West 2006).
10
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Most states across the country have provisions similar to those enacted by
Kentucky.' 2 Virginia, for instance, uses as its adjusted gross income the gross income under federal taxes, yet explicitly requires "obligations of any state other than
Virginia" be added back into the calculation. 3 Similarly, Massachusetts requires outof-state bonds to be included in their determination of adjusted gross income. 4 New
York, which is at the center of the secondary securities market in municipal bonds,
also provides tax exemption for its own bonds while taxing bonds from other states. 5
Not only would the effects of overturning such a taxation scheme affect cities and
states, but also it would have far-reaching effects on the health of the municipal bond
6
securities markets.'

That tax treatment incites debate over its constitutionality, in particular, whether
it violates the Dormant Commerce Clause. The only case to broach the subject in recent memory is Davis v. DepartmentofRevenue ofKentucky. 7 George and Catherine

Davis, residents of Kentucky, owned municipal bonds issued in Kentucky, as well as
municipal bonds issued outside the state. 18 The couple sought a declaratory judgment
alleging that the tax treatment violates the Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection
Clause by discriminating based on the bonds' origins. 9 The Kentucky appellate court,
in a concise opinion, held the system to be "facially unconstitutional as it obviously
affords more favorable taxation treatment to in-state bonds than it does to extraterritorially issued bonds."'2 The court reasoned that the Ohio appellate court did not
sufficiently support its decision in Shaper v. Tracy with analysis to uphold a similar
taxation scheme. 2' Furthermore, the Kentucky court also dismissed arguments under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause22 and the market participant doctrine, ultimately
12

See, e.g., DEL. CODEANN. tit. 30, § 1106(a)(1) (2009) ('There shall be added to federal

adjusted gross income: [i]interest ... other than interest on obligations and securities of this
State .... "); D.C. CODE §47-1803.02(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. 2008) ("[T]he following items
shall also be included ... in the computation of District gross income: [interest upon the
obligations of a state, territory of the United States, or any political subdivision thereof, but
not including the District of Columbia .... "); MicH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 206.30(l)(a) (2009)
("Add gross interest income and dividends derived from obligations or securities of states other
than Michigan ....
); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5747.01(A)(1) (West Supp. 2006) ("Add
interest or dividends on obligations or securities of any state or of any political subdivision or
authority of any state, other than this state and its subdivisions and authorities.").
13 VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-322(B)(1) (2004).
14 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 62, § 2(a)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2008).
1' N.Y. TAx LAW § 612(b)(1) (McKinney 2008).
16
'7
'8

See Herman, supra note 5.

197 S.W.3d 557 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006), rev'd, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008).
Id. at 560.

19 Id.
20

Id. at 562.

21

647 N.E.2d 550 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 907 (1995).

22

Davis, 197 S.W.3d at 563--64 (distinguishing Bonapartev. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592

(1881), on grounds that the Commerce Clause was not implicated in Bonaparte,and the Full
Faith and Credit Clause was not at issue in Davis).
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finding for the Davises. 23 The Supreme Court, on the other hand, easily dismantled
the Kentucky appellate court's reasoning, stating that Davis was closest akin to United
Haulers, in that the tax scheme favored a traditional government function without
any differential treatment favoring local entities over substantially similar out-of-state
interests.24 The quintessential public function of issuing bonds under the United
Haulersstandard was sufficient to move Kentucky's differential taxation scheme out
from under Dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny.23
11. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF MUNICIPAL FUNDRAISING

A. TraditionalMethods of Fundraising
Since cities and states first began organizing in the late 1600s and early 1700s,
municipal fundraising at both a state and local level existed.26 Primarily through taxes,
cities and states were able to raise funds necessary to support education, train armed
militias, develop forms of social insurance, and benefit the public at large.27 Over
time, more public works projects developed and governments sought evolving ways
of addressing their financing needs.2" City and state spending comes in two variations: operating expenses, which are covered by tax revenues, and capital expenditures, which are financed by issuing municipal bonds. 29 As the demand for larger
scale capital improvements increased, borrowing from banks, increased tax collections, and public land sales were less and less adequate.3" Soon after, cities and states
began to issue municipal bonds as a way of raising the funds necessary for the capital
3
projects. '
2 Id. at 564 (stating the taxation and not issuance was at issue, the computation of taxes
is clearly "'a primeval governmental activity,"' and thus the State is a market regulator
(quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 277 (1988))).
24 Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v.Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1811 (2008) ("Thus, United Haulers
provides a firm basis for reversal.").
25

id.

26

Gordon L. Calvert, Development, Volume, Purchasersand Ratings,in FUNDAMENTALS

OF MUNICIPAL BONDS 15, 16 (Gordon L. Calvert ed., 1959); see also Craig Johnson &
Marilyn Manks Rubin, The Municipal Bond Market: Structureand Changes, in HANDBOOK
OF PUBLIC FINANCE 483, 485 (Fred Thompson & Mark T. Green eds., 1998).
27
28

Calvert, supra note 26, at 15.
Id. at 15-16.

29 Id. at 15.
30

ld.

31 Id. at 15-16. Some scholars argue it was implicit in the decision in McCulloch v.

Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), that municipal bonds were exempt from federal
taxation, suggesting there was already a burgeoning market at the time of the decision. ROBERT
LAMB & STEPHEN P. RAPPAPORT, MUNICIPAL BONDS 4-5 (2d ed. 1987).
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B. United States Municipal Bond Market

Issuing municipal debt became particularly important as a means to expand the
nation's transportation systems to promote the industrializing economy.32 Nearly all
of the early bond issues went to build canals, create a more integrated network of railroads, and develop more efficient roads. 33 By 1843, there was a total of $232 million
in municipal debt outstanding, soon ballooning to $1.63 billion outstanding in 1902representing growth of more than 600%.' The purpose for municipal bonds extended
beyond transportation, education, utilities, and government buildings. 35 As demand
for public services increased, so too did the variety of public purposes. From airports
and sports stadiums to golf courses and parks, municipal issues vastly expanded to
match an exploding demand for public projects.36

The municipal bond market continues to steadily grow and adapt to the changing
public needs. As automobiles became more prevalent, the standard of living and the
labor force increased in the early 1900s, and so too did the use of municipal debt to
finance public projects. 37 This continued through World War H and on into the
1970s.38 In 1975, municipalities issued $26 billion,39 soon expanding to over $263
billion by 1999, an increase of nearly 915% in twenty-four years. 40 This expansive
growth resulted in over $2.09 trillion outstanding in municipal debt in 2005 to finance
various public projects.4 1
Aside from the growth in size of the market, municipalities have also become
more savvy as it comes to the type, structure, and development of their bond issues.
The term to maturity, structure of repayment, varying interest rates, and compounding
of interest all followed trends in the corporate securities markets.42 One example is
zero coupon bonds, which defer semi-annual interest payments to the bonds' maturity,
thus reducing the current and near-term liability, but requiring a larger long-term
32

Calvert, supra note 26.

33 Id.

34 Id.
31 Id. at 16-17.
36 Id. at 17. Between 1946 and 1958, municipal bond use escalated nearly seven-fold from
$1.2 billion to more than $7.4 billion. Id. at 20.
31 Id. at 16.
38

Id.

39 JUDY WESALO TEMEL, THE BOND MKT. Ass'N, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNICIPAL

BONDs 3 (5th ed. 2001).
40 Id.
41 U.S. CENsus BUREAU, Gov'TS

Div.,

TABLE 1: STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

FINANCES BY LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT AND BY STATE: 2004-05 (2007), availableat http://

www.census.gov/govs/estimate/0500ussl_ l.html.
42 See Alan Walter Steiss, New Financing Instruments for State and Local Capital
Facilities,PUB. BUDGETING & FIN., Fall 1998, at 24.
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balloon payment.43 Municipalities also responded to volatile interest rates by issuing
tax-exempt bonds with a floating interest rate to reduce the risk of depleting value to
issuers and purchasers alike. 44 These adaptations to the ever-present changes in the
market have continued to make municipal bonds an attractive investment for
individual and institutional investors.4"
C. PurposesofMunicipal Bonds
Adaptations to the market for municipal bond issues mainly derived from increased need for funding and the new variety of purposes. States and localities traditionally used municipal funding to support public transportation, though that purpose
has become a minor use.4 Development and upgrading of public utilities, healthcare
facilities, student loans, capital and economic improvements such as waterfront restoration, and housing structures have all recently been funded by municipal debt.47 One
example of the expanding purposes is the issuance of bonds in Louisiana following
Hurricane Katrina. Louisiana congressional members sought more than $30 billion
in tax-exempt bonds to rebuild the gulf coast and New Orleans. 4' The bond issue was
to benefit local business, redevelop infrastructure, and rebuild the devastated gulf
coast region.49
In Virginia, education reforms and developments became the purpose of a recent
bond issue. Under voter referendum in November 2002, voters in Virginia approved
a $900 million bond issue aimed at improving the College of William & Mary's law
library, expanding a cancer treatment center at Virginia Commonwealth University,
constructing a new arts and sciences building at the University of Virginia, and a biology building at Virginia Tech.50 Virginia issued its bonds to provide funding for the
state-sponsored educational facilities to support their pedagogical objectives. 5' The
State also sought to make Virginia public education more competitive with public and
at 29.
44 Id. at 32-33.
41 Id. at 24.
' See TEMEL, supra note 39, at 53-54.
41 Id. During 1999, 22.2% of proceeds of municipal debt supported education at various
levels. Id.
48 Christine Richard & Tom Sullivan, LouisianaAsks Approval to Issue $30 Billion in
Tax-Free Bonds, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2005, at C4. The bonds to be issued were not municipal bonds, but were to be issued by corporations with tax-exempt status. Id. Upon review,
President Bush opposed the bailout on grounds that the U.S. would not assume debt, but would
rather provide tax relief and business loans to invest in the region and create local jobs. Rob
Wells, White House Opposes Muni-Bond Bailout, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 2005, at C4.
41 See Richard & Sullivan, supra note 48.
'0 Jeff E. Schapiro, Casteen Makes Casefor Turnout on Bond Issue, RICHMOND TIMEsDISPATCH, Nov. 3, 2002, at Cl.
51 Id.
41

Id.
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private schools across the country, especially as education becomes more technology
based.5 2 The Virginia issue provides an example of the changing landscape in purposes for municipal financing.
D. Benefits of Municipal Bonds

Beyond the uses and purposes of municipal bond issues, public debt financing
increased, in part, because the benefits are wide ranging and significant across many
parties. Local states, cities, and towns benefit from lower borrowing costs while
citizens benefit from tax exemption. 3 Improving state facilities and services tends to
increase the quality of public education, healthcare, and other amenities.' The
injection of government spending and private investment into the economy, moreover,
provides essentially riskless investments and a large infusion of public spending to
bolster an otherwise struggling economy.55
The primary benefit of issuing municipal bonds is that it lowers the borrowing
costs to municipalities.56 Various econometric studies demonstrate the effect that
such tax differentials and exemptions have upon the local borrowing costs.57 States
and localities are able to issue debt at lower costs, meaning a lower interest expense
burden as the bonds come due.58 From another perspective, the lower borrowing costs
allow the State or locality to issue more bonds, collect more net proceeds, and initiate
more public works projects for the same cost. For example, if borrowing costs were
reduced by two percent on a $100 million issue, that saves the locality $2 million and
allows the savings to be spent on other public works projects, such as capital improvements to educational facilities. Municipalities are able to reduce their interest burden
through the state tax treatment of the bond interest income to investors.59

52

Id.

" See generally Mary E. Lovely & Michael J. Wasylenko, State Taxation of Interest
Income and Municipal Borrowing Costs, 45 NAT'L TAX J. 37 (1992) (discussing the effect

of state exemption of municipal bond interest on the yield to maturity offered by public issuers
to finance their debt).
14 See ROBERT H. FRANK & BEN S. BERNANKE, PRINCIPLES OF EcONOMICs 399-473 (3d
ed. 2007).
5 See id. at 399-473, 555-85.
56 See Lovely & Wasylenko, supra note 53, at 47 ("These estimates provide strong evidence that the widespread practice of exempting residents from state personal income tax on
in-state municipal bond interest income significantly reduces municipal borrowing costs.").
17 See id. ("For the tax variables, the model suggests that higher tax rates on out-of-state
municipal bond interest income and lower tax rates on in-state municipal bond interest income
will lower borrowing costs for in-state issuers."); see also David S. Kidwell et al., The Impact
of State Income Taxes on MunicipalBorrowing Costs, 37 NAT'L TAX J. 551 (1984).
58 See Lovely & Wasylenko, supra note 53, at 48.
'9 See id. at 47.
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The benefits of municipal fundraising also extend to the citizens by reducing their
tax burden from investments and aiding in economic recovery. A personal investment
portfolio with only corporate bond investments pays tax at the prevailing tax rate on
the interest received from those investments.' In 2007, a single individual with
taxable income from employment over $77,100 paid twenty-eight percent tax on each
dollar earned from employment, dividends, and corporate bond interest above that
income level.6 Conversely, an individual in the same tax bracket with a pure
municipal bond portfolio would not see his portfolio affect his taxable income and his
tax burden. The individual investor reduces his tax burden through investment in
municipal bonds. Indirectly, this also benefits the municipalities by creating stronger
incentives for local investment. Municipal fundraising has also been used in times of
dire economic conditions.62 The injection of government spending into a floundering
economy provides a local boost to production and income, causing increases in
demand and supporting a local economic recovery. 63 Reducing individual tax burdens
and aiding economic growth provide two significant benefits of municipal issues.
While municipal bonds have been a predominant method of raising funds for
capital projects at previously unimagined interest costs, they have also become an
important part of diversification and risk management in current investor portfolios.' 4
As the market continues to expand and embrace municipal offerings, financing becomes more readily available for States and localities-primarily due to their favorable
tax treatment across jurisdictions. Moreover, recent constitutional challenges to tax
treatment schemes leave investors uncertain as to the stability of the market.
Ill. DORMANT

COMMERCE CLAUSE OVERVIEW

The Commerce Clause expressly grants Congress the power to enact legislation
affecting commerce "among the several states" 65 and implicitly creates a prohibition
6 I.R.C. § 61(a)(4) (2006).
61 Internal Revenue Service, 2007 Federal Tax Rate Schedules, http://www.irs.gov/
formspubs/article/0,,id=164272,00.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2009); see also 26 U.S.C.
§ 61(a)(4), (a)(7) (2006) ("[G]ross income means all income from whatever source derived,
including (but not limited to) the following items: [i]nterest; [d]ividends; ....
").
62 See Michael A. Pollock, Municipal-BondSales Headfor Record Territory as State,
Local Governments Tackle Budget Gaps, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2001, at C12.
63 Though there is concern over crowding out, which explains why government
spending
increases cause a nearly identical reduction in private investment in the long run, those effects
are not felt initially and perhaps hardly at all as long as municipal bond issues are not regular,
consistent, or overwhelmingly large. A discussion of crowding out is better left to economists.
See FRANK & BERNANKE,supra note 54.
' For an example of a proposed portfolio, see OppenheimerFunds, Municipal Bond Funds,
https:llwww.oppenheimerfunds.coml/investors/educationmunicipalBondFunds.jhtml (last
visited Jan. 27, 2009).
65 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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on states from creating legislation discriminating against interstate commerce. 66 The
implication is that a state cannot prohibit, restrict, or discriminate against products
from other states. Michigan, for example, cannot enact legislation prohibiting importation of buckeyes from Ohio. The prohibition mainly rests upon arguments that the
67
Constitution vests Congress with exclusive dominion over regulation of commerce;
however, policy arguments further suggest the need to develop national markets 68 and
encourage interstate commerce through uniform regulation. 69
It is uncertain from where exactly the negative aspect of the Commerce Clause
derives, though there are certainly traces in the development and text of the Constitution
and early cases.70 In Gibbons v. Ogden, for example, the Court emphasized that the
power to regulate commerce, "like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself,
may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations.",7' Justice
Marshall suggested that the power of Congress to regulate commerce is complete and
cannot be infringed by the states, implicitly arguing that states are precluded from regulating interstate commerce.72 As the dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause came
to the foreground, principled intention gave way to categorical distinctions, which
only served to muddy the standard over the past hundred years. As discussed in the
next section, today's jurisprudence reflects no coherent standard for cases arising
under the Dormant Commerce Clause.
A. Public/PrivateDistinction
One recent addition to the categorical distinctions is the public and private nature
of the protected entity. 73 After UnitedHaulersAss'n v. Oneida-Herkimer,the Court's
Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence essentially turns on a significant distinction:
whether the law favors local government. 74 According to the Court in United Haulers,
6 Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1872).
67 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
6 Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 299 (1997) (stating that the "dormant
Commerce Clause's fundamental objective" was in "preserving a national market for competition undisturbed by preferential advantages conferred by a State upon its residents or
resident competitors").
69 For an interesting discussion on the game theoretical implications of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, see Maxwell L. Steams, A BeautifidMend: A Game TheoreticalAnalysis
of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine,45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1 (2003).
70 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1.
7'Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 196.
72 id.
7' First Amendment

jurisprudence provides an analogy to the public/private distinction
embraced in Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. See, e.g., Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,
420 U.S. 546 (1975) (holding that a municipal auditorium was a public forum and speech
was protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments).
74127 S.Ct. 1786, 1795-96 (2007).
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"it does not make sense to regard laws favoring local government and laws favoring
private industry with equal skepticism. ' 75 As a result, the Court applied a softer
standard to the ordinance put forth in United Haulers, requiring only a Pike-test
analysis, because it was favoring a publicly created corporation for the benefit of the
locality. 76 Had the law favored in-state over out-of-state private enterprise, the Court
would have applied the standard applicable under City ofPhiladelphiav. New Jersey,
which addresses concerns of economic protectionism. 77 In adopting the analysis in
UnitedHaulers, the Court in Davis held that the state tax scheme and corresponding
issuance of bonds was favoring local government, rather than private industry, which
led solely to Pike-test analysis.7"
The standard in United Haulers notes that laws favoring local government are
treated with less scrutiny than those favoring private industry, provided the law favoring local government treats all private business, whether in-state or out-of-state,
identically. 79 In United Haulers,all private waste carriers, whether local or interstate,
were required to deliver solid waste generated within the counties to the public
processing site."° In that case, Chief Justice Roberts, speaking for the Court, utilized
the Pike test. 8' The Pike test applies to laws "directed to legitimate local concerns,
with effects upon interstate commerce that are only incidental."82 The test first must
ascertain whether the law was directed at a legitimate local concern and then whether
the burden imposed on interstate commerce is clearly excessive compared with the
local benefits.83
In future analysis, the Court must now consider the implications of whether the
law favors local government. As the distinction was razor-thin between Carboneand
United Haulers, so too will the distinction be thin in future cases.84 The question no
longer is whether the law discriminates against interstate commerce, but whether favorability to local government provides an exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause
prohibition. In this manner, how does a public law favoring a private nonprofit organization providing wireless technology services exclusively to a town, compare to a
state agency fulfilling the same objectives? Under the distinction drawn in United
Haulers, they appear to receive different treatment-the state agency would be
71 Id. at

1795.
Id. at 1797. For an explanation of what constitutes the Pike test, see infra notes 90-96
and accompanying text.
77 Id. at 1793 (citing City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)).
78 Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1817 (2008).
79 United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1795 (plurality opinion).
80 Id. at 1791 n.2.
81 Id. at 1797.
82 City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 624.
83 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
8 For a discussion of C &A Carbone,Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994),
see infra notes 133-35, 171-74 and accompanying text.
76
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exempted while the nonprofit organization would be prohibited. The services are
substantially the same, so it seems the only plausible explanation for the distinction
is the strength of the State's interest in favoring local government.
B. Economic Protectionism
When addressing the validity of statutes under the Commerce Clause, the Court
answers a broad question, the public or private dichotomy aside, before determining
the level of scrutiny with which to assess the statute. The Court must consider whether
the statute is inherently protectionist." Inthe case of an economically protectionist
statute, the scrutiny is much more stringent and severe than when the statute addresses
local concerns with incidental effects on interstate commerce.86 The Court's jurisprudence consistently holds discriminatory laws motivated primarily by economic protectionism to be contrary to the Dormant Commerce Clause by a "virtually per se rule
of invalidity. ' 87 This presumption of invalidity can be rebutted by fulfilling the
Court's haphazard attempt at heightened scrutiny analysis.88 In City of Philadelphia
v. New Jersey, the Court found that a statute prohibiting importation of solid waste
originating outside of New Jersey to be economically protectionist and contrary to the
Commerce Clause.89 In nearly all discernible cases, the Court has found economic
protectionism to be dispositive.
When a statute is not economically protectionist on its face, in its purpose, or in
its effect, the Court applies the Pike test to determine whether the law was directed
toward legitimate local concerns and whether the burden imposed on interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the local benefits. ° In Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., Arizona required uniform packaging containers for all fruits and vegetables
shipped within the state, primarily in response to consumer dissatisfaction and Arizona
growers' declining reputations as some shipped inferior produce.9 To comply, Bruce
Church Inc. would have needed to build a new packaging plant at a cost of $200,000,
which would have prevented their participation in Arizona's produce markets.92 The
statute appeared facially neutral, yet required a company to operate in Arizona to package produce properly.93 Despite the potentially discriminatory effect, the Court decided it was appropriate to require a balancing of the State's interests against the burden
on interstate commerce. 94 Similar to much of the Court's Fourteenth Amendment
85City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 624.
86

id.

Id.; see, e.g., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 403-06 (1948).
See, e.g., City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 626-28.
Id. at 628.
9 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
87

88
89

91

Id.

92Id. at 144.
93 Id. at 145.
94Id. at 145-46.
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jurisprudence, the Pike test involves a balancing of policies, benefits, and burdens. 95
As a result, it employs less searching scrutiny and merely requires that the burden is
less than excessive as compared to the purported local benefits.96
This economic protectionism standard becomes murky when considering close
cases. In Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, a North Carolina
statute required uniform labeling across all shipping crates of apples, regardless of
their point of origin.97 The Court found the statute to be facially neutral and not
economically protectionist on its face, yet stated that it was discriminatory in effect
because it imposed a significant burden on Washington apple growers.98 The Court
required the State to prove the substance of the local benefits and that there were no
non-discriminatory alternatives that would preserve those local benefits equally well. 9
Under traditional Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, it would have been discriminatory in effect and would have been presumed economically protectionist, subjecting
the statute to higher scrutiny. In this case, the Court's test sounded eerily similar to
the balancing test employed in Pike. °° The Court failed to adequately draw the distinction and would likely have come to a different result under Pike.
In Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, the Court declared unconstitutional an
ordinance requiring milk sold in Madison to be pasteurized within five miles of the
city."° ' The ordinance did not facially discriminate against out-of-state milk, but required it be pasteurized in the area in the wake of local health concems.'° 2 The Court
found that the law was discriminatory in effect and unconstitutional because there
were less burdensome alternatives. 1" 3 This case, like Hunt, is eerily similar to Pike
in its effect and discrimination against interstate commerce, yet the two cases are

'5 The Court in Davis seemed to rebuke the Pike test, suggesting "that the Judicial Branch
is not institutionally suited to draw reliable conclusions of the kind that would be necessary
for the Davises to satisfy a Pike burden in this particular case." Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v.
Davis, 128 S.Ct. 1801, 1817 (2008). In that statement, the Court suggests the Pike test is inappropriate, but only for this case, while still leaving the possibility open for its reversal in
the future. At this point, Pike remains good law. Justice Scalia, on the other hand, stated that
he "would abandon the Pike-balancing enterprise altogether and leave these quintessentially
legislative judgments with the branch to which the Constitution assigns them." Id. at 1821
(Scalia, J., concurring in part).
96 Pike, 397 U.S. at 142; see, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456,
471 (1981) (citing Pike as requiring the Court to strike even-handed statutes imposing incidental
burdens on interstate commerce if the burden is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits).
97 432 U.S. 333, 336 (1977).
98 Id. at 352-53.
99 Id. at 353.
10o Id.

l0 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
IO Id. at 352-53.
103 Id. at 354.
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treated much differently and perhaps decided incorrectly as a result of the determination as to their discriminatory or economically protectionist effect. This distinction
only furthers the gross categorization difficulties of the Dormant Commerce Clause,
indicating a need for a standard that accounts for these differences without requiring
square pegs to fit in round holes.
C. Market ParticipantException
As the Supreme Court expanded Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, it necessarily collided with the needs and practicality of the State in participating in the
marketplace. States readily act as buyers and sellers in a continually expanding national and international market, which pushes the State beyond its traditional role as
solely a governmental entity. Sensing this paradigm shift,"° the Court developed the
market participant doctrine, primarily through its decision in Hughes v. Alexandria
10 5

Scrap Corp.

What initially began as consideration of an aesthetic problem of abandoned automobiles became essentially an incentivized clean-up program.' °6 Maryland's legislature sought to eliminate old automobile hulks, defined as inoperable automobiles over
eight years old, lining junkyards, blighted areas, and roadsides. 7 The State rewarded
those recyclers with a "bounty" for each hulk retrieved and delivered to a licensed
scrap metal processor.' 8 In 1974, Maryland supplemented the provisions by requiring
documents proving clear title before receiving the bounty.' 09 In-state processors were
only required to submit a statement from the deliverer, whereas the law required outof-state processors to submit a certificate of title."' As a result, Alexandria Scrap
challenged the law, stating it violated the Commerce Clause by impeding interstate
commerce."'
In its decision, the Court contrasted Maryland's actions with those of other governmental entities who had undertaken interstate market regulations." 2 According
"o4 See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRucruRE OF SCIENTIFc REVOLUTIONS (1996)
(defining paradigm shifts as academic and intellectual revolutions in the midst of peaceful
developments, such that there are changes in fundamental assumptions or bedrock doctrine).
'0' 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
'06 Id. at 796.
'07 Id. at 796-97.
'o' Id. at 797 (citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 66 , § 5-205 (Supp. 1975)).
"o9 Id. at 800 (citing 1974 Md. Laws, c. 465).
"o Id. at 800-01. The law only required Maryland processors to submit a signed statement
from the deliverer claiming his right to the automobile and to indemnify the processor if title
became uncertain. Id. Non-Maryland processors, however, were required to submit a certificate
of title, which made out-of-state participation much more challenging. Id.
".. Id. at

802.

Id. at 805-06; see, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949);
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
112
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to the Court, the impact in those prior cases was interference with the "natural functioning of the interstate market" through prohibition or regulation." 13 The difference
between Maryland and the other state actions was that Maryland "entered into the
market itself' as opposed to acting as a market regulator." 4 The Court stated,
"[n]othing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State...
from participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens
over others."' 5 From this holding, which was later expanded in other cases, the
6
Court created the market participant exception. 1
The Court faced several concerns. First, in cases like Alexandria Scrap, the State
acts like a buyer or seller in the market, temporarily abandoning its role as a market
regulator." 7 Businesses may sell to or buy from any subset of the population they
choose. Similarly, when states enter a role akin to a private business, such rights
should apply."' The Court in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake decided, in part, on this argument.'" 9 South Dakota built a state-owned cement facility to provide an adequate
supply to its citizens in times of shortage. 20 During those times, state policy was
to prevent sales out-of-state and only sell to its residents, effectively discriminating
against out-of-state purchasers.'
The Court found that state proprietary activity
was also subject to the same restrictions as private business, and "[e]venhandedness
suggests" states should share the same freedoms, in particular, to buy and sell from
those of their choosing.'
The Court noted the difference between the State as a
private entity and participant compared to its role as a regulator was inherent in the
Commerce Clause.'23
The Court has seen this distinction before and has ruled on the dual role of government as both a market regulator and market participant. In White v. Massachusetts
Council of Construction Employees, Inc., a local ordinance in Boston required
".Alexandria Scrap
114
"5

116

Corp., 426 U.S. at 806.

Id.
Id. at 810.

See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436 (1980) ('The basic distinction drawn in

Alexandria Scrap between States as market participants and States as market regulators makes
good sense and sound law.").
"7 Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. at 809.
"' Reeves, Inc., 447 U.S. at 439 (holding a state-run cement plant in South Dakota was

a market participant and when acting as such, states are afforded similar market freedoms);
see also Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 127 (1940) ("Like private individuals
and businesses, the Government enjoys the unrestricted power to produce its own supplies,
to determine those with whom it will deal, and to fix the terms and conditions upon which it
will make needed purchases.").
120

Reeves, Inc., 447 U.S. at 436-37.
Id. at 430.

12

Id. at 432.

122

Id. at 439.
Id. at 436-37 ("As [AlexandriaScrap Corp.] explains, the Commerce Clause responds

"'

123

principally to state taxes and regulatory measures impeding free private trade in the national
marketplace.").
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construction projects paid for partially or fully with city funds had to be performed
24
I
and completed by work forces with at least half of its crew as residents of Boston.
The government acted in dual roles in White, acting as a regulator by requiring a
certain percentage of the employees be residents of Boston, and as a participant by
employing the firms it chose to build its public works projects. 25 The actions in regulation and in participation complemented one another-the participation in selecting its construction firms complemented the regulation requiring Boston residents
as at least half of the work force by ensuring that the city's goals and objectives were
fulfilled. Similarly, the Court in Davis recognized this distinction, noting that issuing
bonds was the State and locality acting in its market participant role and that differential taxation was within its role as market regulator. 2 6 The Court stated that the roles
of regulator and participant cannot be viewed in isolation as any type of Commerce
Clause economic protectionism or discrimination. 27 In Davis, as compared to White,
the roles of the government were essentially the same-part regulator, part participant-dual, joint, and continuing. In the same manner as in White, as the Court in
Davis noted, it is not unconstitutional discrimination if it creates a commercial advantage for local governments, even if they are acting in dual roles. 128 Acting in these
dual roles cannot be seen in isolation, and the State's role as a market participant is
only further muddied as it is uncertain how to adequately place the majority of the
State's influence-as either favoring private industry or acting in the public's interest.
The market participant exception continually demonstrates its importance as
states become players in various industries, including state production of products
for consumer and manufacturer use.' 29 A serious problem arises when a state acts
460 U.S. 204, 206 (1983).
Id. at 214-15 ("Insofar as the city expended only its own funds in entering into construction contracts for public projects, it was a market participant .... Insofar as the Mayor's
executive order was applied to projects funded [by federal programs] the order was affirimatively sanctioned by the pertinent regulations of those programs.").
126 Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1812 (2008) (plurality opinion)
(stating that the Davises made "a fair point to the extent that they argue that Kentucky acts in
two roles at once, issuing bonds and setting taxes," then proceeding to analyze the distinctions
in roles).
127 Id. "It simply blinks this reality to disaggregate the Commonwealth's two roles and
pretend that in exempting the income from its securities, Kentucky is independently regulating or regulating in the garden variety way that has made a State vulnerable to the dormant
Commerce Clause." Id. Justice Souter also remarked that viewing the regulation and participation in isolation was "a denial of economic reality." Id. at 1814 n. 17.
128 See id. at 1812-14. The plurality in Davis makes the point that "cases on market participation joined with regulation (the usual situation) prescribe exceptional treatment for this
direct governmental activity in commercial markets for the public's benefit." Id. at 1814
(footnote omitted). The plurality then stated that Kentucky's taxation scheme is not a violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause "because the Commonwealth's direct participation
favors, not local private entrepreneurs, but the Commonwealth and local governments." Id.
The plurality said it was not unconstitutional within the dual roles. Id.
129 See, e.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
124

125
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as both a regulator of an industry, through taxes, for example, and as a participant in
the market. Where does the Court draw the line between participant and regulator
when the State is essentially wearing both hats? If in Reeves, South Dakota decided
to unfavorably tax all of its cement-producing opponents, it would clearly make South
Dakota a market regulator as well, but how, if at all, would that change the analysis
in the Court's market participant exception? This muddied consideration leaves little
room for the Court to decide without developing a more principled standard for its
Dormant Commerce Clause analysis.
D. Looking Back Before Looking Forward
Beyond the implications of the market participant exception, the Court's current
Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is fraught with confusion, uncertainty, and little
proper guidance. 3 ° With the advent of UnitedHaulers,the Court required an initial
inquiry into whether the law favors local government-another question to answer
before finding any substantive discussion of the local law in question. 3 ' In answering these questions and categorically applying their answers to any set of facts, imprudent results may arise. Consider C & A Carbone,Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown,
wherein Clarkstown, New York, provided its trash services to a private vendor in
exchange for construction of a waste facility that would be turned over to the city
after five years.' 32 In that case, which the Court discusses in United Haulers,33 the
law clearly favored the private vendor by providing trash services, but it also benefited
the city by having a city waste facility five years later and free of debt obligations. 1m
The Court in UnitedHaulersdistinguished the cases, but can it be said that categorization based on favoring local government is proper? This Note appreciates the distinction-and many others created by a patchwork of decisions-but believes a more
balanced approach can provide the Court with structured footing for its analysis.
IV. PROPOSING A NEW STANDARD

A. A New Standard
This Note proposes a significant shift in Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
by adjusting the standard used by the Supreme Court in deciding whether state laws
Winkfield F. Twyman, Jr., Beyond Purpose: Addressing State Discrimination in
InterstateCommerce, 46 S.C. L. REv. 381,383 (1995) (describing current Dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine as incoherent, unclear, and full of "myriad shadows").
"' United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786,
1795-96 (2007) (plurality opinion).
132 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
a 127 S. Ct. at 1793-95 (plurality opinion).
,3 Carbone, 511 U.S. at 387.
130
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promulgated violate the negative aspect of the Commerce Clause. This Note proposes
that the Supreme Court use a variation on the strict scrutiny standard to examine the
state law, its purpose and justification, and the strength of the State's interest in legislating the issue. Strict scrutiny, in its analogous use with the Dormant Commerce Clause,
proves to be a more "principled" approach, 35 imposes less judicial public policy considerations without prior legislative action, and encourages free markets across states
rather than "Balkanization" 13 6 when the State's interest is not compelling.
In discrimination and suspect class cases under the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Supreme Court frequently uses strict scrutiny to analyze the constitutionality of those
dubious laws.' 37 Under a similar variation, this Note proposes the Supreme Court
require a compelling state interest justifying restrictions on interstate commerce.
Furthermore, the State should narrowly tailor the law to impose the least burdensome alternative required to fulfill the compelling interest. The Court infrequently
used a standard vaguely akin to that proposed here, though less rigorous and closer
to an intermediate scrutiny standard to assess potential Dormant Commerce Clause
violations. 13 8 This Note proposes the Court use a strict scrutiny standard when considering local laws that are facially discriminatory or facially neutral in their treatment
of interstate commerce.
B. Development of Strict Scrutiny
The origins of strict scrutiny are relatively unknown, or at the least unclear,
though many attribute it to Justice Stone's opinion for the majority, in particular
footnote four, in United States v. Carolene Products Co. 139 The doctrine would
strike down statutes drawn for discriminatory purposes and other suspect uses, while
allowing statutes protecting "vital government interests" to "survive."'" Its modem
interpretation developed as a doctrine in response to many delicate issues clouding
the Court during the Warren era.' 4' The Court faced racial discrimination, 4 ' privacy
"I United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1801 (Thomas, J., concurring).
136 See, e.g., Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93,98 (1994) (discussing the interest in "avoid[ing] the tendencies toward economic Balkanization").
131 See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (holding that racial
classifications are still subject to strict scrutiny even if they are benign classifications).
138 See, e.g., New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278-79 (1988) (stating
that precedent allows local statutes and ordinances to be upheld if there is a "legitimate local
purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives").
1 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (stating it was unnecessary to determine whether discriminatory legislation was "to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation"); see also
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict JudicialScrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1267, 1270 (2007).
"4o Fallon, supra note 139, at 1271.
141 Id. at 1270.
142 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
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intrusions, 143 and freedom of speech restrictions,'" which redefined how the Court
approached issues of fundamental rights of citizens.
The Court searched for a method that would avoid the problems associated with
previous balancing criticisms and recalcitrant second-guessing of congressional and
state legislation. 45 In the early 1900s, the Court decided Lochner v. New York, which
held a labor law restricting the hours a baker could work, for the purpose of protecting the baker's health, to be unconstitutional.'" This decision led to a series of cases
during the Progressive Era and the Great Depression that struck down economic regulations deemed to violate individuals' rights. 147 During that time, there was little in
the way of a coherent standard the Court used to structure its opinions.' 48 After 1937,
the Court slowly began to develop its standards of review, in particular, to create strict
scrutiny to adjudicate cases with various types of discrimination. 49
The strict scrutiny standard became a "generic test for the protection of fundamental rights" as the Court faced more complicated personal liberty issues. 5 ° It
"impose[d] discipline.., on judicial decisionmaking" and provided a solution to
protect fundamental rights that were inadequately protected under rational basis review.151 Such a standard of review would provide structure to balancing challenges,
untenable and untethered judicial action, and policy-driven decisions that have plagued
the Court's Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine for nearly a century, much in the
way that it provided a framework for a wandering Court after the Lochner era.

214, 216 (1944) (stating that racial classifications required "the most rigid scrutiny").
41 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a law prohibiting use
of contraception violated spousal privacy).
'44 See generally Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding the Ohio Criminal
Syndicalism Act to be unconstitutional for violating the First Amendment's guarantee of free
speech).
145 See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S.
45 (1905).
146 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Lochner was later overturned, or at least its principles and
methodology discarded, in a series of cases leading up to the Court's decision in West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish,300 U.S. 379 (1937) (holding that a minimum wage statute enacted by
Washington state was constitutional). The Lochner era, as it came to be known, was marred
by decisions that seemed to be made more by personal ideology than by objective, constitutional principles. The Lochner era saw the Court neglect to use any tenable or consistent
standard for reviewing cases with any discriminatory implications. Fallon, supra note 139.
41 See, e.g., Hammer, 247 U.S. 251 (holding the Tenth Amendment to be a restriction on
Congress's authority to regulate commerce).
148
'49

1
'.'

Fallon, supra note 139.
See supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
Fallon, supra note 139, at 1271.
Id. at 1270.
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C. Reasons for Strict Scrutiny in Dormant Commerce Clause Cases

1. A More Principled Approach
Strict scrutiny, as opposed to other approaches under the Dormant Commerce
Clause, provides a more "principled" approach, 12 which the Court typically desires,
especially where doctrine has been continuously murky for nearly a century. 153 It
allows the Court to follow a structured process in deciding cases on a uniform basis,
while still allowing flexibility to adjust to the facts of specific cases. Requiring a compelling government interest when there is economic protectionism sets an objective
standard for courts to apply and for legislatures to achieve.
The Court essentially uses something akin to strict scrutiny in Dormant Commerce
Clause cases, but never truly follows the formal analysis to any consistent, principled
approach. 4 More accurately, the Court uses an intermediate scrutiny standard, of
sorts, as its basis for review in Dormant Commerce Clause cases.' Such a standard
bows more to the "judicial whims" of the ideological focus of each Justice as opposed
to the constitutional analysis that it requires. Less exacting standards for the strength
of the State's interest allow public policy implications to become more significant in
allowing an otherwise protectionist law to stand. Those less exacting standards create
great uncertainty in the use and understanding of the several distinctions the Court
makes before deciding a Dormant Commerce Clause case. The varying categorical
tests not only create uncertainty, but also provide little guidance for district courts and
circuit courts in following Court precedent. Providing the formalized, and stricter,
structure allows the Court to make decisions harmonious to precedent, while adding
a stronger basis for predictability in future decisions.'56
2. Properly Explains Precedent in a Principled, Predictable Context
Applying strict scrutiny properly explains most Dormant Commerce Clause precedent, yet does so in a principled and predictable context. The considerations and
152 United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786,
1801 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).

153

Id.

"54

Id. at 1806-09 (Alito, J., dissenting).

...Id. at 1795-96.
156 See, e.g., Peter Caldwell, Hostile EnvironmentSexual Harassment& FirstAmendment
Content-Neutrality:Puttingthe Supreme Court on the Right Path, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.

L.J. 373, 407 (2006) (recommending strict scrutiny as a way for the Supreme Court to solve
the difficulties of content-neutrality analysis); Elizabeth Blanks Hindman, The Chickens Have
Come Home to Roost: Individualism, Collectivism and Conflict in Commercial Speech
Doctrine, 9 COMM. L. & POL'Y 237 (2004) (recommending strict scrutiny as a principled
approach to deciding commercial speech cases).
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distinctions made by the Court in earlier cases still have bearing on decisions under
strict scrutiny, but are not dispositive and are not prohibitive. United Haulers, for
instance, would still have been decided in favor of the county due to the strength of
the county's interest in providing waste management services. The county's interest
was strong and the law was evenly applied to in-state and out-of-state business.
Furthermore, the State's interest in Maine v. Taylor would not only be compelling,
but restricting the importation of fish that would have carried the parasite is a prime
example of narrowly tailored legislation to fit that compelling interest.'57 Beyond
satisfying precedent in a controlled manner, the strict scrutiny doctrine accounts for
the market participant exception, which the Court touted in Alexandria Scrap and
Reeves. 58 In cases blurring the lines of any clear-cut distinctions, such as quasi-public
entities or facially neutral laws with negligible impact on interstate commerce, strict
scrutiny properly decides those cases based on varying considerations. In a way unlike any of the Court's attempts, strict scrutiny in the Dormant Commerce Clause context provides a principled and predictable approach that explains past precedent under
its terms.
3. Predictability and Stability for State and Local Legislatures
Beyond its principled application in cases before the Court, strict scrutiny would
provide a more structured basis upon which states could enact laws regarding interstate commerce. Strict scrutiny would enable state legislatures considering future
legislation to account accurately for the constitutional implications of restricting outof-state commerce or preferring local business. For example, in creating a state statute regarding milk regulation, a legislature inevitably encounters challenges under
the Dormant Commerce Clause, but the question remains as to how courts will react
to the implementation and application of the statute. The current patchwork standard
creates uncertainty and challenges for states and localities, but using strict scrutiny
quells those uncertainties and challenges. How is a state to determine under which
categorical determination its law falls? A state developing uniform waste management laws and attempting to reduce its landfill use by eliminating out-of-state trash
deposits faces the economic discrimination distinction and classification, but under
strict scrutiny, public health is a factor in the State's interest and the scope of the law
discerns whether it is narrowly tailored. A city creating a wastewater treatment facility
for temporarily private benefit and soon to be turned over to the town, under current
doctrine, is subject to the public/private distinction, yet under strict scrutiny it factors
into the strength of the State's interest. Under current doctrine, the cases are fraught
...For a discussion of Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986), see infra notes 180-85 and
accompanying text.
158 See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426
U.S. 794 (1976).
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with confusion and do not provide predictability or guidance to lower courts, state
legislatures, or city councils. Using a strict scrutiny analysis, the Court would be able
to provide more stable and predictable decisions to guide local lawmakers in creating
laws that avoid Dormant Commerce Clause implications.
4. Expanding Free Markets
A strict scrutiny regime encourages the expansion of the ideals behind the Dormant
Commerce Clause-in particular, expanding free trade within the states and reducing
market segmentation. The Court in Hughes v. Oklahoma noted that the Framers designed the Commerce Clause to "avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization
that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the States under the
Articles of Confederation."' 59 The Framers also intended to prevent states from economically retaliating against one another by enacting similar statutes to prohibit outof-state business from participating in in-state commerce."6 The overall effect and
encouragement of Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is to encourage the development of a free and national market, unburdened of restraints between states in interstate commerce.' 6 ' Adjusting the standard to strict scrutiny encourages free trade with
only limited state interference by requiring those statutes burdening interstate commerce to be supported by compelling state justifications and narrowly tailored to fit
those interests.
If strict scrutiny was the standard, it would discourage laws that protect local
business because the State's interest in protecting local business would not typically
rise to "compelling." Moreover, there would likely be less burdensome alternatives.
If Virginia decided to implement a law requiring all stores selling North Carolina
tobacco products to sell Virginia tobacco products and at a lower price, the law would
fail strict scrutiny analysis. The State's interest in promoting local tobacco producers
and increasing tobacco sales would have little to do with benefitting public health
or welfare. The lower price would also interfere with North Carolina's tobacco industry based on state borders alone, reducing interstate commerce. Even if there were
a compelling justification, there would be several less burdensome alternatives that
would allow the Virginia tobacco industry to expand, including increased subsidies,
state advertising campaigns, state purchases of tobacco, and other considerations. The
Court would strike down that statute as violating the Dormant Commerce Clause and
would allow for products from North Carolina to flow into Virginia, encouraging
increased trade.
9 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979).
16 C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994) (stating that
discriminatory statutes "excite thosejealousies and retaliatory measures the Constitution was
designed to prevent").
161 See Comment, The Uniformity Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1193, 1213-15 (1984)
(discussing the economic and free trade implications of the Dormant Commerce Clause and
suggesting it encourages national uniformity in commerce).
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D. Analyzing Past Precedent Under Strict Scrutiny
The imposition of strict scrutiny in a course of constitutional law embedded in
more than a century's worth of decisions poses difficult questions as to those decisions' applicability to cases going forward. By considering each of the cases under
different elements of the standard of review, we can discern how, if at all, such defined
and settled cases would pertain to new doctrinal standards. In this section, this Note
considers each of the main elements of strict scrutiny--compelling State justification
and interest, narrowly tailored, and no less burdensome alternatives-to determine
how several past cases fit into the new standard and may relate to future Dormant
Commerce Clause applications, then applies those elements to one of the foremost
Dormant Commerce Clause cases.
1. Past Cases Concerning Compelling State Justification and Interest
In cases where strict scrutiny is applied, the Court requires the State to have a
compelling interest or justification for legislating the issue as it did.'62 By requiring
a compelling interest, the Court stringently protects those rights that it deems to be
fundamental or essential. In the context of the Dormant Commerce Clause, it safeguards the operation of a national market and promotes economic efficiency through
free trade. Those interests tend to be strong, but still may be overridden by local ordinances or state legislation to protect its own local economic interests.
In United Haulers, the Court enunciated the public/private distinction wherein
public facilities and entities may be favored in interstate commerce. 163 This distinction, as Justice Alito states-and with which Justices Stevens and Kennedy agree-is
one that is both "illusory and without precedent."'(' Under a strict scrutiny regime,
this distinction is no longer dispositive, but rather provides the State with a stronger
compelling interest in the analysis. Local government has significant responsibilities
in ensuring the welfare, health, and safety of its citizens, which "set state and local government apart from a typical private business."' 16 Laws protecting local government
"may be directed toward any number of legitimate goals unrelated to protectionism."'
162 See, e.g., Grutter v.Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding student body diversity was
a compelling State interest that justified the use of race in law school admissions); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding the end of the first trimester to be an approximate point
at which the State's interest became compelling to protect the health of the mother and the
viability of the child).
163 United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786,
1793-95 (2007). The Court also noted other distinctions with Carbone,which allowed the
local law in UnitedHaulersto survive Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, but the primary
distinction came over the nature of the facility favored. Id.
'64 Id. at 1804 (Alito, J., dissenting).
'65 Id. at 1795 (majority opinion).
'66 Id. at 1796.
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As a result, the State's interest in legislating for the public's welfare benefit is more
compelling than legislating for private economic benefit. Furthermore, a democratic
vote by the citizens of the counties provides additional strength to the government's
interest, in that it was understood, desired, and approved by its citizens. 67 By favoring and supporting a public entity for the welfare of the State, the compelling nature
of the interest is achieved and reaffirmed, fulfilling the first prong of strict scrutiny
review.
United Haulersmay survive strict scrutiny, but the standard allows public favoritism without a sufficient governmental interest to be declared unconstitutional. The
Court-Justice Thomas, for one-is apprehensive about expanding discrimination in
favor of state-owned or local municipality operations on grounds that it protects and
benefits local private interests and is simple economic protectionism, despite arguments that it solely benefits local municipalities.' 6 The concern appears to be over a
slippery slope into a socialist mindset for states and localities, suggesting that a brightline rule that discrimination benefitting public entities and excluding private participants encourages excessive government intervention into free markets. 69 In using
a strict scrutiny standard, discrimination benefitting a public entity without a compelling justification and not narrowly tailored would be unconstitutional and prevent
a slide down the slippery slope.
Compared to United Haulers, Carbone suggested that legislation benefitting
private facilities provides a weaker State justification and does not fulfill the requirement for a compelling State interest. 7 ° In Carbone,Clarkstown, New York, encouraged a local private contractor to build and operate for five years a local solid waste
transfer station, at a cost of $1.4 million, before conveying it to the town for nominal
consideration.171 The deal would have guaranteed tipping fees to the private contractor by ordinance requiring all solid waste within the town to be deposited at that
transfer station. 172 As a result, the ordinance only benefitted the private contractor
by essentially providing a private monopoly on local garbage processing. The Court
struck down the ordinance, saying it was clear economic protectionism and prevented73
out-of-state competitors from pedaling their products within the local municipality. '
In the context of strict scrutiny analysis, the State's interest in protecting private industry is significantly lower than the State's interest in protecting and promoting its
167

Id. at 1797.

Id. at 1801 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id.
170 See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994) (holding that
a local ordinance requiring solid waste be processed within the town be handled at the town's
transfer station was unconstitutional on grounds it discriminated against interstate commerce
in part for favoring a private business and precluding competition).
'"I id. at 387.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 390.
168
169
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citizens' health, welfare, and safety. Had the State in Carbone had a primary purpose
of promoting any of those justifications, the public's interest may have been stronger;
however, supporting a private industry indicates a lower State interest or justification in establishing the local ordinance. The argument can be made that it was in the
State's strongest interests to encourage the local contractor, mainly because the State
would essentially have a waste transfer station built at another's expense; however,
the private short-run benefits accrued to the private contractor, and costs paid by all
residents of the town weighed down the State's interest. As the Court stated it was
unconstitutional in Carbone, so too would the ordinance be unconstitutional under
a strict scrutiny regime.
Considering Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission provides
further insight into the compelling justification requirement.'74 In restricting the packaging and labeling used on apple crates shipped to the state, North Carolina attempted
to "eliminate this source of deception and confusion by replacing the numerous state
grades with a single uniform standard."'75 The Court saw through these dubious claims
and recognized the statute as supporting local North Carolina apple growers by raising
the cost of business for out-of-state farmers. 176 In a case like this, concerns of narrow
tailoring and less burdensome alternatives aside, the State's interest is exceptionally
weak. Reducing consumer confusion between various state grades of apples has little
to do with public welfare, health, or safety, and is not significant enough to justify
a massive cost increase across the board for out-of-state apple growers. 7 7 Under strict
scrutiny, the Court would be hard-pressed to find a compelling justification for State
interference, thus striking the statute down and falling in line with the Court's decision.
2. Past Cases Concerning Narrowly Tailored Legislation
Strict scrutiny also requires that laws be narrowly tailored to fit their proclaimed
purpose and the State's interest in legislating the issue. 78 This ensures that states and
localities are legislating within the limits of their interest in infringing on a fundamental right; moreover, it ensures that only those situations that the State intends to
influence are actually affected, preventing over- and under-inclusion. This requirement further fulfills the purposes and goals of strict scrutiny, including encouraging
predictability in application and future enactment.
In Maine v. Taylor,the State enacted a statute prohibiting importation of bait fish
to prevent a pandemic across its inland water population. 179 In its argument, the State
174432 U.S. 333
171Id. at 349.
176

(1977).

Id. at 350-51.

177Id. at 351.
171See supra Part IV.B.
179ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,

§ 12556 (2005).
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declared it had promoted the statute as a way of ensuring the health of its fishing population as well as preventing the spread of a parasite from relatively remote sections of
the state to the vast majority of freshwater stores." 0 The State argued that imported
bait fish posed significant threats to Maine's fisheries, namely that indigenous fish
would be at risk to contract parasites and nonnative species would disturb the local
ecology in unpredictable and subtle ways. l'' The State's experts at trial further argued
that they could not inspect shipments of bait fish to determine whether the parasites
or commingled species were present. 8 2 The Court took these compelling justifications
and interests into account when assessing the statute's fit.8 3 The Court noted that
the statute was only legislating against bait fish, which appeared to be the only class
of fish both affected by the parasite and unable to be inspected properly.' 4 Under
the strict scrutiny standard proposed by this Note, the statute is sufficiently narrow
as to only include the affected class and is neither over- nor under-inclusive. It does
not include trout, salmon, and other game fish, but only those fish affected by the
parasite and without a viable inspection procedure. Upheld by the Court under its
current patchwork doctrine, it would be similarly upheld under strict scrutiny as being
narrowly tailored to fit the State's interest.
A second important example is DeanMilk Co. v. City of Madison. s5 A milk company that purchased milk from 950 farms across southern Wisconsin and northern
Illinois, producing Grade A milk as rated by public health authorities in Chicago,
was denied access to the Madison milk market by an ordinance which required all
milk sold in the city to be pasteurized within five miles of the city square. 8 6 Even if
the Court had assumed, under strict scrutiny, that the State's interest in public health
and milk quality was compelling, despite claims and arguments suggesting it was for
private benefit, the Court would have had trouble upholding the ordinance on grounds
the city did not narrowly tailor it to those interests. In this case, banning all milk outside a certain arbitrary mileage is overly broad-it does not allow properly evaluated
and inspected milk to be competitive in the market, thus burdening interstate commerce. 8 7 What makes milk pasteurized two miles away any different from milk pasteurized six miles away? If the city aimed the ordinance at ensuring higher inspection
standards, it may find that pasteurized milk within five miles is, in fact, less healthy
than milk produced by Dean Milk Company. In order to fulfill the narrowly tailored
i80 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 141 (1986).
181 Id.

Id. at 141-42.
Id. at 143-44.
"8 Id. at 141-42 (stating that inspection for parasites required "destruction of the fish" and
made it exceptionally challenging to inspect for parasites among bait fish, despite the fact that
sampling tests had been created for salmon and trout mixed breeds).
182

183

185

340 U.S. 349 (1951).

Id. at 352.
117 Id. at 350 n.1 (citing General Ordinances of the City of Madison, 1949, § 7.21).
186
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requirement, the city could have enacted an ordinance that required inspection for
all milk not obtaining a Grade A rating from approved inspection agencies, such as
the Chicago public health authorities. It would have ensured milk quality and not
unduly burdened interstate commerce. The requirement for a narrowly tailored law
is more protection against interference with interstate commerce, yet it still provides
an exception for state and local interests to be met.
3. Past Cases Concerning Less Burdensome Alternatives
Under traditional Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine and under other strict
scrutiny regimes throughout constitutional law, courts have required no less restrictive or burdensome alternatives be available before deeming a statute or ordinance
constitutional. 88 There must not be a non-discriminatory way of achieving the same
result, which is akin to the Court's requirement that the ordinance be narrowly tailored.' 89 This ensures there is no needless discrimination against individuals, races,
religions, and other classifications. In the context of the Dormant Commerce Clause,
it would ensure no needless discrimination against out-of-state entities. Furthermore,
the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is designed to encourage interstate commerce
and reduce barriers preventing trade between states. By ensuring the least burdensome alternative is applied if there is regulation or restriction, it still fulfills those goals
and minimizes the effect on a national market.
Similar to considerations of narrowly tailoring the statute, Maine v. Taylor also
stands for the notion that there were no viable alternatives and the legislation imposed
was the least restrictive alternative available. The Court suggested repeatedly that it
was near impossible to police the spread of the bait fish parasite without imposing a
bar on all out-of-state bait fish from the local fisheries."9 As a result, the Court saw
no viable, less burdensome alternatives available to the State to prevent the proliferation of the parasite and its effect on the local ecology.' 9 ' The Court found the local
purposes "could not adequately be served by available nondiscriminatory alternatives"
and so upheld the statute as constitutional within the Dormant Commerce Clause. "
Analyzing Maine v. Taylor under the proposed strict scrutiny regime would similarly
require there be no viable and less burdensome or less discriminatory alternatives.
Due to the fact there was no inspection method satisfactory to determine whether the
Roe and Grutterboth provide an overview of the application and implementation of
the strict scrutiny standard, including the tacit requirement for the restriction on a fundamental
right to be the least burdensome alternative. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
189 See supra notes 178-87 and accompanying text.
19 See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1986) (recalling lower court expert testimony indicating that sampling the shipments and the inspection procedures would cause bait
188

fish to die prior to concluding the tests).
9' Id. at 151.
192

Id.
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parasite existed and to allow the fish to survive inspection and importation, there
would be no less restrictive alternatives.
4. A Broader Look at City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey
In City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey, the Court held a New Jersey statute prohibiting importation of waste originated or collected outside the state to be unconstitutional. 193 New Jersey enacted a statute preventing outside trash from crossing state
lines into New Jersey, purported to be a health measure to diminish the spread of
viruses, diseases, and reduce outside health risks."9 Protection of the health, safety,
and welfare of a state's citizens suggests a strong, if not compelling, interest and justification in infringing upon interstate commerce in an attempt to alleviate the other
pressing concerns. The Court noted that there were valid justifications for the law,
95
but that it had several other issues that would make it unconstitutional.
First, the Court said the statute was overly broad and drew boundaries around the
state in an attempt to protect the economic welfare of local business. 96 Trash in New
Jersey is no different from trash in any other state, so to exclude trash from importation merely on grounds that it was from another state essentially creates state border
barriers. 97 The Court's argument suggests that since the origin was indistinguishable,
it was overly broad by preventing trash from any other state without a true justification for imposing such a restraint. 9 8 The State's interest in reducing landfill levels
as a means of improving health and welfare stretched beyond its authority in developing the state-boundary scope of the statute. Under strict scrutiny, the Court would
require-which seems to have applied in City of Philadelphia-theState to narrowly tailor the statute to fit the State's interest and compelling justification. In this
case, the State did not narrowly tailor the statute to affect the State's interest and so
the statute should be overturned on those grounds.
Second, there were several alternatives open to New Jersey in order to protect
health, safety, and welfare. Instilling a large-scale prohibition on trash from any other
191 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
" Id. at 625 (reciting that the purpose of the statute was for the public health, safety, and
welfare of the citizens of New Jersey).
"' One concern not addressed here is that the Court found the law not to be equivalent to
a quarantine law. Id. at 628-29. For a historical overview of quarantine law and its applications
circa 1892 as well as comparisons with current terrorism concerns, see Felice Batlan, Law in
the Time of Cholera:Disease,State Power, and QuarantinesPastand Future,80 TEMP. L.

REv. 53 (2007).
'96 City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 628 ("What is crucial is the attempt by one State to
isolate itself from a problem common to many by erecting a barrier against the movement
of interstate trade.").
"9 Id. at 629 ("The harms caused by waste are said to arise after its disposal in landfill sites,
and at that point ... there is no basis to distinguish out-of-state waste from domestic waste.").
'98 Id. at 627-28.
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place of origin was not the least burdensome alternative the State could have considered in enacting such a statute. Other, less restrictive and burdensome alternatives
include capping the amount of land used for landfill purposes, taxing all in-state and
out-of-state garbage services to create incentive for individuals to reduce their trash
burden, or subsidizing individuals or trash services companies who dump trash in
other states. Each of these facially non-discriminatory alternatives provides methods
to reduce waste storage in local landfills and presumably improve local health, safety,
and welfare. Compared with the language included in the statute, these alternatives
would be less burdensome and non-discriminatory, which only reinforces the notion
that the statute at issue in City of Philadelphiawas unconstitutional. Had New Jersey
any reason to believe failing health was a result of garbage and waste from a certain
region, it would likely have no less burdensome alternative than to restrict trash importation, similar to the restriction on bait fish which the Court approved in Maine
v. Taylor.
Under a strict scrutiny regime on all economically protectionist statutes questioned
by the Dormant Commerce Clause, the statute in City ofPhiladelphiadoes not fulfill
the prongs of the test. First, the State's interest in protecting the health, safety, and
welfare of its citizens is generally strong, so the compelling nature of the interest can
generally be unquestioned. Second, the statute was overly broad because the legislature did not narrowly tailor it to avoid excluding importation of trash based on
state boundaries while still supporting the State's interest in improving local health.
Finally, there were several alternatives available to the State that would have been
much less intrusive and burdensome on interstate commerce than the method selected.
The State could have imposed even-handed taxes to reduce trash influx, subsidized
trash exportation, or capped the land available for landfills in an effort to reduce trash
levels in the state. Any of these alternatives would have been a much tighter fit to the
State's interest and in effecting a law narrowly tailored to affect that interest. Imposing strict scrutiny under the facts of City of Philadelphiaresults in the same decision,
yet with a much more disciplined, principled, and structured method of analysis.
5. Market Participant Exception
Under the market participant exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause, states
that participate in the market are able to enact legislation ensuring their participation
and are able to then discriminate against any while a member of the marketplace. The
key examples include Maryland's ability to act as a private entity when purchasing
car hulks' and South Dakota's actions as a private business selling cement only to
residents as an emergency store.200 As a result, the Court has upheld these statutes
and state actions as valid exercises under the Dormant Commerce Clause. Under the
19 See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).

200

See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
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strict scrutiny standard, the exception would still exclude state participation in close
cases from the purview of the Dormant Commerce Clause, though with a stronger
basis for its application.
The Court noted expressly that when States are clearly participants in the market,
they are exempted from the limitations of the Dormant Commerce Clause.20' Clear
cases when the State is solely a participant in the market, rather than fulfilling a dual
role as a regulator and participant, the Dormant Commerce Clause does not affect
State action, though the doctrine is less certain in close cases. 202 When the State has
that dual role, much depends on the categorization as a market participant or a market
regulator-yet another distinction and categorization that increases doctrinal confusion. By applying strict scrutiny, close cases, which may otherwise rely on this
distinction, do not require an explicit categorization, but rather face more contoured
analysis. Strict scrutiny would allow states in dual roles to be assessed on the impact and interests inherent in those roles as to whether the Dormant Commerce
Clause would restrict action. 20 3 In Davis, Part mI-B of the Court's opinion discussed
the dual roles of the state government as both a regulator and a participant. 2' 4 The
Court, in the only part of the opinion that was a plurality rather than a majority,
further blurred the distinction with the market participant doctrine by essentially
holding that the dual roles in a taxation context defaults to a participant role.20 5 Had
the Court applied strict scrutiny, rather than another distinction as to the roles of the
State, the dual roles could have been measured, balanced, and tempered to determine
the strength of the State's interest and the fit of the statute.
Strict scrutiny, as discussed above, requires a compelling State interest and a law
narrowly tailored to fulfill that interest, and the law must be the least burdensome
alternative. 20 6 The market participant exception plays strongly into the State's interest.
South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82,93 (1984) ("Our cases make
clear that if a State is acting as a market participant, rather than as a market regulator, the
dormant Commerce Clause places no limitation on its activities." (citations omitted)).
202 From another angle, the market participant exception likely does not reach the point of
strict scrutiny analysis because the Dormant Commerce Clause does not prohibit-explicitly
or implicitly-the State's participation and the right to favor its citizens expressly in that
venture. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. at 810.
203 For an example of the dual roles, see White v. MassachusettsCouncil of Construction
Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204,206 (1983), and DepartmentofRevenue ofKentucky v. Davis,
128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008). Both White and Davis addressed issues of the dual role of the state
government as a participant and regulator, including mention of how it further complicates
the Dormant Commerce Clause analysis.
204 Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1811-14 (plurality opinion); see alsosupra notes 123-28 and accompanying text. Part m1-B of the Court's opinion in Davis was notjoined by Chief Justice Roberts
or Justice Ginsburg, which makes that part, and that part alone, a plurality opinion written
by Justice Souter. Id. at 1804 (majority opinion); id. at 1821 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
205 Id. at 1811-14 (plurality opinion); see also supra notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
206 See supra Part IV.A.
201
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As the State steps out of the role of regulator and into the role of participant, it enters
the market with a purpose of favoring and benefitting its citizens. 2°7 The State still
competes with others in relevant markets, but merely chooses to deal exclusively with
its residents at times, enhancing the State's interest in its actions benefitting local
citizens." The strength of the State's interest only increases further as it becomes an
integral player in the local market, especially as the State provides important services
or products and seeks higher objectives such as public health and welfare.
Applying strict scrutiny to Reeves, Inc. v. Stake establishes that the exception
holds. The State took part in the market as a distributor and manufacturer of cement
for all in-state and out-of-state contractors.2 9 When cement shortage became a growing concern, the State consciously chose only to sell to in-state contractors to ensure
their continued production for the economic welfare of the state.210 If South Dakota's
cement plant was required to sell based on uniform criteria and regardless of the
buyer's residence, North Dakota could simply subsidize the purchases in times of
shortage and allow their companies to pay a premium over South Dakota purchasers,
essentially bidding the South Dakota contractors out of business. This would not only
destroy the state's market for cement and construction but also discourage State participation in markets subject to fluctuation or high barriers to entry. 1 ' The State's
interest in supporting industry as a participant, separate from a regulator, is quite compelling and meets the rigor of strict scrutiny. The State's action in Reeves, providing
cement to in-state contractors first in a time of shortage, is also narrowly tailored to
serve the interests of the State. In Reeves, it only showed preference for in-state contractors when it was necessary to do so, thus limiting the discrimination based solely
upon state lines. The State narrowly tailored the law to ensure continued production
and the general public welfare of the state.
The same analysis of the State's interest applies in closer cases where the State
may not be purely a market participant, but may also be acting as a market regulator.
In those cases, the outcome hinges almost entirely on the determination of the purity
of participation in the market and the lack of regulatory impact on the same market.
Using rigid determinations under the current doctrine keeps a compelling State interest
from consideration in closer cases. In a case such as Davis, where the State plays an
active role in both fields, the distinction blurs, if not vanishes, in the analysis. 212 Strict

Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429,436 (1980) (quoting Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426
U.S. at 810).
207

208 See, e.g., id.

Id. at 429.
id.
211 Municipal fundraising has a high barrier to entry. Municipal bond issues overcome those
209
210

hurdles and allow for State participation where there would otherwise be a challenging market.
See supra Part11.
212 See Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1811-14 (2008); see also supra

notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
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scrutiny, on the other hand, accounts for those dual roles by adjusting the State's
interest accordingly, allowing a State with an exceptionally compelling interest to
fill both the role of a regulator and a participant.
V. A SECOND LOOK AT DAVIs

The most recent Dormant Commerce Clause case before the Supreme Court is
from the October 2007 Term, Departmentof Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis.2 13 As described above, 1 4 the Daviscase involved a husband and wife, residents of Kentucky,
who owned municipal bonds issued by Kentucky and several other states. 21 5 As a
result, Kentucky taxed their out-of-state holdings, yet exempted their in-state municipal bonds. 1 6 Under current Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, the case turns on
whether the State is a regulator for the taxation of the bonds, or a participant for issuing the bonds. That distinction fails to account for the State's interests in issuing the
bonds for public works projects and maintaining financial security. In a strict scrutiny
regime, the interest of the State is compelling and narrowly tailored sufficiently to
achieve their ends, finding the tax exemption does not violate the Dormant Commerce
Clause.
A. Undera New Standard
Analysis of Davis under this Note's proposed new standard of strict scrutiny
requires considering the State's interest, the narrowness of the law, and whether it is
the least burdensome alternative. Under the facts in Davis, the widespread use of
dual taxation schemes, compelling benefits accrued to states and localities, and the
necessity of low-cost financing each justify the State's compelling interest in issuing
municipal bonds with differing state tax treatment. Moreover, the law is narrowly
tailored to meet those benefits by encouraging the development of local bond markets
and encouraging local investment. With the widespread use of these schemes in the
vast majority of states, especially since their inception over two centuries ago, 21 7 the

213

128 S.Ct. 1801.

214

See supra Part I.
Davis v. Dep't of Ky., 197 S.W.3d 557, 560, rev'd, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008).
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.010(10)(c) (West 2006); see supra notes 11-15 and

215
216

accompanying text.
2117 The Court almost appeared to decide the case on the sheer fact that the policies and
statutes had been in place for hundreds of years. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1819. The Court quoted
Justice Holmes from his opinion in Paddell v. City of New York, 211 U.S. 446, 448 (1908),
stating, "The fact that the system has been in force for a very long time is of itself a strong
reason.., for leaving any improvement that may be desired to the legislature." Id. Justice
Thomas similarly makes this point, stating, "The practice is thus both longstanding and widespread, yet Congress has refrained from preempting it." Id. at 1822 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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benefits of tax exemption are widely available. Finally, the Kentucky taxation scheme,
akin to nearly all state taxation schemes, provides the least burdensome alternative
in terms of the burden on the public and the municipal financing cost burden on the
localities. In each instance, the municipal bond taxation meets the standard of strict
scrutiny and would be upheld under this Note's proposed new standard for Dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
1. Compelling State Interest
The State's interest manifests itself quite differently depending on the doctrine
used to analyze it. Current Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, based on several distinct categorizations, begins with whether the statute discriminates against interstate
commerce."' On its face, the taxation assessment only exempts those bond obligations
from Kentucky, not those from sister states, making it appear to discriminate against
bonds in interstate commerce. 21 9 A comparable analogy is from City ofPhiladelphia
v. New Jersey, wherein the State prohibited garbage importation and the Court found
the statute to be facially discriminatory because "[o]n its face, it imposes on out-ofstate commercial interests the full burden of conserving the State's remaining landfill
space.""22 Under the standard in City of Philadelphiaand without considering the
public benefit, the statute in Kentucky appears to be facially discriminatory.
Despite this determination, if the Court holds the statute to "benefit a clearly
public facility, while treating all private companies exactly the same," then it can
decide it does "not discriminate against interstate commerce for purposes of the
dormant Commerce Clause., 22' Due to the public/private distinction, the Court in
UnitedHaulersstated that the flow control statute did not discriminate against interstate commerce.2 2 Similarly, the statute in question clearly benefits public facilities
by providing funding for public works projects, including school construction and
road maintenance.223 In Davis, the Court determined that the Kentucky taxation and
United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S.Ct.
1786, 1793 (2007) ("To determine whether a law violates this so-called 'dormant' aspect
of the Commerce Clause, we first ask whether it discriminates on its face against interstate
commerce.").
219 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 141.010(10)(c) (West 2006); see supra notes 11-15 and
accompanying text.
220 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978).
221 United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1795.
222 Id.
223 Justice Kennedy, in dissent in Davis, argued that it was essentially an endorsement of
states' police power trumping congressional authority under the Commerce Clause. Dep't
of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1822 (2008) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice
Kennedy further argued that "[i]t is difficult to identify any state law that has come before
us that would not meet the Court's description." Id. at 1824. The Court disputed this, noting
that the inquiry was to determine "whether the preference was for the benefit of a government
218
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bond-issuing scheme was most akin to United Haulers, that is to say that it favored
the local government, all while treating private bond issuers, whether in- or out-of224
state, identically.
The market participant exception, under current doctrine and the plurality opinion
in Davis, was a significant factor in its analysis due to Kentucky's dual role as a regulator and a participant in the municipal bond market. 22 In New Energy Co. ofIndiana
v. Limbach, the Court clearly stated that the "market-participation doctrine has no
application" in cases over the "assessment and computation of taxes-a primeval government activity. '226 As such, the Court declared the exception dead whenever the
State is acting solely as a taxing body and not in a competitive manner. 227 Since the
State is acting as both a regulator through the imposition of taxes and a participant
by issuing bonds in Davis, the exception applies under current Dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine.228 Justice Souter, writing for the plurality, rejected the argument
that Kentucky's regulatory taxation power should be viewed in isolation, noting the
Court had upheld the dual role of the State or local government previously in White.229
Justice Souter argued that the market participation was an integral piece of the Court's
holding, stating that "there is no ignoring the fact that imposing the differential tax
scheme makes sense only because Kentucky is also a bond issuer. "230 In Justice
Souter's analysis, the market participant doctrine was dispositive and sufficient to
distinguish the differential tax treatment of municipal bonds from previous violations
of the Dormant Commerce Clause.231
fulfilling governmental obligations or for the benefit of private interests." Id. at 1810 n.9
(majority opinion).
224 Id. at 1811. The Court noted that "the Kentucky tax scheme parallels the ordinance upheld in United Haulers: it 'benefit[s] a clearly public [issuer, that is, Kentucky], while treating all private [issuers] exactly the same."' Id. (alteration in original). The Court also found
Davis to be squarely in line with United Haulers-"Thus,United Haulers provides a firm

basis for reversal." Id.
223 Id. at 1811-14 (plurality opinion). Justice Souter also draws a distinction between Camps
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison,520 U.S. 564 (1997), in which the Court held

that a "'tax exemption is not the sort of direct state involvement in the market that falls within
the market-participation doctrine."' Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1814 n. 17 (quoting CampsNewfound,
520 U.S. at 593). The tax exemption in Camps Newfound was not accompanied by market
participation, such as issuing municipal bonds, as was the tax scheme in Davis, which was
dispositive for the plurality's analysis. Id.
226 486 U.S. 269, 277 (1988).
227

Id.

228

Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1812 (plurality opinion).

Id. at 1813-14 (discussing White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S.
204 (1983)).
229
230

Id. at 1812 (plurality opinion).

23Iid. 'The

Commonwealth has entered the market for debt securities, just as Maryland
entered the market for automobile hulks and South Dakota entered the cement market." Id.
(citations omitted).
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Under strict scrutiny, the State's interest is only made stronger by its participation
in the market as an issuer of municipal bonds. By looking only at the State's interest,
it allows these close cases to be correctly decided as opposed to prohibiting State
action in such a close case merely because they did not fit squarely into the round hole
left vacant by the market participant exception. Despite the outcome under the categorized exception, the State's participation plays a role in the strength of its interest.
The State's interests in maintaining municipal bond markets, promoting local and
statewide public works projects, and stabilizing financing opportunities, as well as
promoting the welfare and health of the public, are significant. The State's compelling
interest remains even in close cases where the State may be partaking as a participant
and a regulator in the same industry.
A State's interest in the welfare and benefits provided its citizens is unwavering
and provides the basis for a compelling State interest under traditional strict scrutiny
doctrine.232 The State's interest primarily derives from benefits accrued to the State
for the issuance of municipal bonds. With a burgeoning market for municipal debt
that continues to expand each year, it is increasingly a source of fundraising for large
capital projects, especially when backed by strong future cash flows from taxation
and income earned from the project's results.233 Schools, government offices, roads,
and other state facilities are just a few of the many projects resulting from municipal
bond issues.234 These projects not only provide amenities to citizens, but also improve
public welfare, public education, and public health directly as a result.235 The Court
in Davis essentially proves the strength of the State's interest-making the observation
that the "indispensability of the current scheme to maintaining single-state markets
serving smaller municipal borrowers" demonstrates that the State objectives are entirely unrelated to protectionism. 236 The Davis Court also noted the revenue loss typically exceeds the interest expense saved, further suggesting that the State's purpose
See, e.g., United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S.
Ct. 1786, 1795 (2007) ("Unlike private enterprise, government is vested with the responsibility
of protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.").
233 See generally Michael Hudson, Muni Bonds Poised to Stay Hot-Busy PublicIssuers
JoinHungry Investorsto HelpAdd Fuelto Robust Market,WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2007, at C6;
Sara Seddon Kilbinger, Investors, Seeking Roads to Riches, Turn to Infrastructure,WALL
ST. J., May 3, 2006, at B6.
234 The Court in Davis notes these important benefits as well as the necessity of the municipal bond market. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1806. 'The significance of the scheme is immense.
Between 1996 and 2002, Kentucky and its subdivisions issued $7.7 billion in long-term bonds
to pay for spending on transportation, public safety, education, utilities, and environmental
protection, among other things." Id. (citation omitted).
235 See id. at 1811. "Bond proceeds are thus the way to shoulder the cardinal civic responsibilities listed in United Haulers: protecting the health, safety, and welfare of citizens." Id.
Throughout the Court's opinion and the plurality's musings, the strong public benefits played
a significant role. See, e.g., id. at 1811, 1815-17.
236 Id. at 1817.
232
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is not protectionism. 237 As the Court has shown in previous decisions, those public
purposes-health, safety, and welfare-strengthen the argument that such a law is
not violative of the Dormant Commerce Clause.238
Moreover, the State's interest also lies in assuring low cost financing to continue
to be able to provide high quality services for its citizens. Municipal bonds traditionally price lower than comparable private issue bonds because of the tax exemption and
the relative stability of municipality finances. The lower cost financing provides the
State with the ability to borrow more money at lower cost for its capital improvements.
The State's interest in the tax exemption of in-state bonds only increases with the
lower cost of financing, which enables more resources for public benefit. In Davis,
the State had a compelling governmental interest in assuring that low-cost financing
continued so as to provide stability of its debt profiles for coming years, including
its ability to pay the interest costs of its current debt. Furthermore, Kentucky also
would face problems with rising costs in light of lower cost financing still available
to other states.239
Perhaps more illustrative is the example of a small, rural town with limited resources for capital projects due to a small, and generally low-income, tax base. In a
small town of 1000 residents with an average annual income of $25,000 per resident,
the annual tax revenue is small, yet the amenities it is expected to provide-police,
emergency services, schools, roads, and more-fail to change. This poses problems
because as tax revenue remains low, smaller towns are unable to pay the costs of bond
issues without the tax exemption. Consider a rural town with enough of a revenue
base to pay interest and costs on $2.5 million in bonds at seven percent interest, but
not a dime more in revenue to pay those costs.240 With tax exemption, the bonds'
interest rates remain at seven percent, but without the exemption, the rates may increase to nine percent, precluding the town from fundraising at the margin-roads
may not be renovated, schools may not be built, and town programs may not be renewed. Small towns with low tax revenue bases suffer from the change in interest rate
that accompanies any changes in tax treatment. In cases like this, the state and local
237
238

Id.
See supra note 208 and accompanying text; see also Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1817.

239 Had the

Court upheld the Kentucky Court of Appeals, it would have meant Kentucky's

municipal bonds were no longer exempt because it struck down Kentucky's statute. Similarly, because no other state statute was in question, the vast majority of states are still able

to exempt their bonds from state taxation, meaning their cost of municipal fundraising would
be significantly lower than Kentucky's and this would disadvantage Kentucky in the national
marketplace. If the Kentucky statute was unconstitutional, it would encourage similar challenges to other states with the same differential tax treatment.
240 Leo: "How could you possibly remember that ten years ago there was a 188 million
dollar debt increase off a 22 billion dollar deficit?" President Bartlet: "God, I was right?" Leo:
"Ah, see, that's what I thought." The West Wing: The Crackpots and These Women (NBC

television broadcast Oct. 20, 1999).
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government's interest in ensuring the differential tax treatment is absolutely vital to
the continuing financial success and advocacy of the public welfare, education, and
health.
Significantly, a standard of strict scrutiny includes these interests, whereas the
current doctrine ignores that which does not fit one of its distinctions. The strength
of the State's interest in providing the taxation benefits evidently is irrelevant compared to whether it favors local government while treating all private entities evenhandedly.24' Strict scrutiny fulfills the Court's need for rigorous inquiry while also
allowing State intervention where appropriate. In Davis, the State's interest is exceptionally strong and meets the strict scrutiny requirements.
2. Narrowly Tailored Legislation
Strict scrutiny requires narrowly tailored legislation supported by the State's
compelling justification. In Davis, the State did not restrictively tailor the statute
providing for tax exemption. The statute creates an exemption from state taxes clearly
delineated on where the resident is taxed, excluding from exemption all those outside
the state.24 2 Despite this demarcation based on residence, the vast majority of other
states have similar statutes and provide their own residents with reciprocity, exempting their own local and statewide municipal obligations.243 Along similar lines, the
Kentucky statute does not prohibit out-of-state individuals from purchasing Kentucky
bonds, though it would lower the yield on the bond because they would be paying
taxes on the interest in their home state.
From another vantage point, there are no feasible, less burdensome alternatives. 2"
Another way to reduce borrowing costs, other than lower the effective interest rate
paid, is to decrease the risk, but in the case of localities issuing bonds, the risk is exceptionally low already, with little room to improve. 2 5 A second alternative is to raise
local taxes, but that also raises potential problems. The imposition would affect all,
rather than those using the resource or those who self-select and accept the risk of the
security issue. 216 It would also allow out-of-state residents to enjoy the benefits of the
See, e.g., United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S.

24

Ct. 1786, 1795 (2007).
242 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 141.010(10)(c) (West 2006).
243 See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
2"

The Court in Davis made no mention of potential alternatives to a bond-issuing and tax-

exemption scheme. See generally Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008).

The Court did, however, point out that a discriminatory law could only survive if it furthered
"'a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory
alternatives."' Id.at 1808 (quoting Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Env'tl Quality of Or., 511
U.S. 93, 101(1994)).
s See supra Part H.D.

Justice Stevens, in his concurrence, noted this point, stating that "state action that motivates the State's taxpayers to lend money to the State is simply not the sort of 'burden' on
246
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higher taxes without having to pay the costs. Moreover, it would lower the total
amount of funds that states could raise, thereby leaving municipalities in a worse
position. A third alternative is for the State or locality to provide fewer services, at
a lower quality, and with a longer time between repairs and updates-yet this would
frustrate the State's compelling interest. Without any possible, less burdensome alternatives, the statute survives constitutional muster.
B. A Final Look at Davis
The new standard for Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence proposed in this
Note, the formal adoption of strict scrutiny, provides a principled framework in which
to analyze Davis. The current doctrine calls for distinctions along the lines of economic protectionism and the public/private nature of the statute, both of which fail
to account for the contours of the State's undulating interest. By requiring a compelling state interest or justification for the statute, it allows all facets of the State's
concern to be accounted for in the analysis. In Davis and under the proposed standard,
the compelling state interest includes health and welfare of its citizens, the quality of
public works projects, the low cost of public financing, and the stability of municipal
bond markets. Those interests, otherwise ignored in current doctrine, become an
important consideration in determining the State's interest. Moreover, the statute
must also be narrowly tailored to fit that state interest. In Davis, there is no viable, less
burdensome alternative than the current structure. Taxes would overburden those
who did not use the resources provided and would prevent the town from raising the
same amount of funds as under the current tax treatment. After analysis under this
Note's standard, the statute in Davis remains valid.
CONCLUSION

Current Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine consists of several distinctions, each
adjusted and used when deemed appropriate by the Court, as opposed to principled
use. UnitedHaulers,the latest in a string of cases providing more attenuated dichotomies, held that otherwise economically protectionist local ordinances could be saved
by virtue of favoring local government, while treating private entities even-handedly."7
Before United Haulersit was Hughes, City of Philadelphia,and New Energy, each
creating its own distinctions and never truly falling in line with precedent, let alone
each other. The fragmented, disjointed, and incoherent Dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine now in use by the Court instills confusion in the wake of myriad patchwork
interstate commerce that is implicated by our dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence."
Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1820-21 (Stevens, J., concurring).
247 United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786,
1795 (2007).
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decisions. A new, principled, and predictable standard will not only clarify the
Court's decisions, but also provide guidance for those preparing, creating, and interpreting local statutes affecting interstate commerce.
This Note proposed a standard of strict scrutiny for application in Dormant
Commerce Clause cases, requiring the State to demonstrate a narrowly tailored law
supported by a compelling interest orjustification.248 This Note explains the virtues
of strict scrutiny in this context-it provides a more principled approach from a wandering Court, properly explains much prior precedent, provides predictability and
stability to local governments, and serves the goal of the Dormant Commerce Clause
in expanding free markets. After rigorous analysis of the Court's prior decisions and
State interests, it is evident that strict scrutiny not only provides a more principled
approach, but also allows the Court to assess those close circumstances by the strength
of interests and the fit of the law rather than by arbitrary classifications. The only
solution to the Court's wanderings throughout Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
is by adopting a new standard and returning to principled jurisprudence.

248 See supra Part IV.A.

